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Abstract 
This paper asks whether students with top journal editors as dissertation advisors observe statistical advantages in 
publishing over students without top journal editors as dissertation advisors. We analyze early-career publication 
histories of nearly 2,000 graduates from top 30 economics programs in the early 1990s. We find that students who 
work with QJE editors average significantly higher values over four common measures of general research 
productivity than otherwise similar students and that students of QJE editors average significantly more AER and QJE 
publications. We further find that both students of ReStat editors and students of Econometrica editors average 
statistically more ReStat articles. Our results appear to reject the argument that top journal editors exhibit undue 
favoritism in the publication process with regards to their former students.
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     1.  Introduction 
 
The competition to publish in top economics journals is intense. This intensity, combined 
with the importance of such publications for academic economists, has lead to the perpetuation 
of many myths concerning the publication process in top economics journals. One of the most 
enduring is the belief that because faculty at top programs hold editorial positions at top journals, 
graduates of those programs benefit from undue favoritism in the publication process due to the 
strength of their connections rather than the quality of their work. As evidence, multiple threads 
at the Economics Job Market Rumors website (www.econjobrumors.com) refer to the supposed 
fact that “Harvard and Chicago students receive a QJE publication or JPE publication as a 
graduation gift.”
1  While Wu (2004), Siegfried (1994), and Laband (1985) demonstrate that large 
fractions of articles published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics and the Journal of Political 
Economy are authored by faculty associated only four top institutions, and obvious question is 
whether this concentration results from undue favoritism or from individuals associated with 
those programs producing higher quality work. Recent attempts to empirically answer this 
question by Medoff (2003), and Laband and Piette (2000) find that papers authored by 
individuals with institutional and personal ties to top journal editors receive more citations than 
other articles, all else equal. 
We add to this literature by analyzing early-career publication histories of nearly 2,000 
graduates from top 30 economics programs in the early 1990s and asking whether students with 
top journal editors as dissertation advisors observe statistical advantages in publishing over 
students without top journal editors as dissertation advisors. We posit that if top journal editors 
are systematically giving undue preference to their advisees’ articles, then we would expect to see their students averaging more publications only at the specific journals which they edit. 
Overall, controlling for editorial service at the American Economic Review (AER), the Quarterly 
Journal of Economics (QJE), Econometrica, or the Review of Economics and Statistics (ReStat), 
we find that students working with QJE editors average significantly higher values over four 
common measures of general research productivity than otherwise similar students. In terms of 
publications within specific top journals, we find that students of QJE editors average 
significantly more AER and QJE publications and that the premium is greater for AER than for 
QJE articles. We further find that both students of ReStat editors and students of Econometrica 
editors average statistically more ReStat articles. As such, our results appear to reject the 
argument that top journal editors exhibit undue favoritism in the publication process with regards 
to their former students. 
 
2.  Our Proposed Test 
 
There are two possible explanations as to why individuals associated with top economics 
programs publish more articles in top economics journals: (1) because editors at top journals are 
likely among the most respected faculty members within their given programs, they may be able 
to identify and capture the very best students who are the ones likely to possess the talent 
required to go on to publish in the top journals (capturing talent) and (2) top journal editors may 
be able to exert undue favoritism by offering their students an unfair advantage in the publication 
process at journal which they edit (undue favoritism). 
We propose a simple empirical test that distinguishes between these explanations by 
exploiting the fact that only a subset of top program graduates work with top journal editors. 
This test is based on comparing the top journal publishing success of students working with top journals editors to that of otherwise similar students not working with top journal editors and 
concluding the following: if top journal editors are capturing talent, then we should observe their 
students publishing more in multiple top journals; if top journal editing advisors are exhibiting 
undue favoritism, then we should observe their students publishing more only in the specific top 
journal which they edit. 
 
3.  Data 
 
We draw the data for this analysis a number of sources. From the Dissertation Abstracts 
database (published by ProQuest Information and Learning), we collected information on 1,888 
dissertations filed in economics fields between 1990 and 1994 for students graduating from top 
30 economics programs and reporting the identity of their dissertation advisor.2 We collect 
individual-specific peer-reviewed publication data as of December 2002 from Econlit, the 
American Economic Association's bibliography of economics literature throughout the world. 
We define research productivity according to four common metrics: the total number of 
publications, the total number of top 5 publications in Scott and Mitias (1996),3 the total pages in 
all journals, and Sauer’s (1988) measure of total pages weighted for journal quality, number of 
authors, and number of characters per page (AEQ Pages). Finally, we collect editorial data from 
the front matter of the AER, QJE, Econometrica, and ReStat during the timeframe of our study 
(1990-2002). While we include JPE publications in our empirical work, because that journal lists 
four to six individuals working in “cooperation with other members of the Department of 
Economics and the Graduate School of Business at the University of Chicago” we do not include 
a specific set of JPE editors in the empirical analysis that follows. 
 
4.  Results  
According to the summary statistics in table 1, roughly 23 percent of the students in our 
sample worked with advisor who served as a top journal editor board at some point during our 
observed time frame. The largest fraction of student, 9.3 percent worked with an ReStat editor 
while the smallest, 4.8 percent, worked with a QJE editor. Overall, only 16 percent of our top 
program graduates published at least one top journal article in their first decade after graduation. 
The percentage doing so is, however, nearly 30 percent among students working with a top 
journal editor as opposed to roughly 12 among student not working with a top journal editor. 
Finally, the only case in which greater percentages of students publish articles in the journals 
which their advisors edit is the AER. We note, however, that in all other cases students publish in 
greater percentages in the AER than in the journal which their advisor edits and that the 
percentage of students of AER editors publishing in the AER is lower than the percentages of 
students of QJE and ReStat editors publishing in the AER. 
Table 2 estimates early-career productivity functions for each of our four productivity 
metrics that control for individual characteristics including editorial affiliations of the student’s 
advisor, the quality of program from which the student graduates, the rank of the advisor with 
which the student works, the field in which the student’s dissertation is written, and whether the 
student was a male and/or international student. We estimate these functions as negative 
binomials to account for the fact that our productivity measures are left-censored. The results 
suggest that, all else equal, students working with QJE editors average statistically greater 
numbers across all four productivity metrics than students working with advisors who do not edit 
a top journal during our time-frame. At the same time, students working with AER, ReStat, and 
Economtrica advisors do not average statistically different numbers than students working with 
top journal non-editors. While these results do not speak directly to the possibility of undue favoritism, they might suggest that QJE editors are capturing talent by advising the most 
productive graduate students. 
Table 3 provides our test of undue favoritism in the publication process at top economics 
journals. Note that due to the small numbers of students in our sample publishing Econometrica 
articles, we are unable to estimate productivity functions for publications in that journal. Overall, 
our results do not appear consistent with the presence of undue favoritism for the four remaining 
top 5 journals. In particular, we only observe students of QJE and ReStat editors averaging 
statistically publications within those specific journals than students of non-editors of those 
journals. At the same time, students of QJE editors average nearly twice as many more AER 
articles than QJE articles, suggesting that such students might simply be better able to publish in 
top outlets. This leaves us with ReStat editors as the only ones potentially exhibiting undue 
favoritism. We note, however, that this may well result from the fact that we are unable to 
estimate productivity functions for Econometrica publications. Namely, given that we observe 
students of ReStat editors averaging the second most Econometrica articles and students of 
Econometrica editors averaging the second most RE Stat articles, we believe that the likelihood 
of publishing in these two more quantitative journals likely depends on quantitative nature of the 
student’s work. As such, we might expect the students of both ReStat and Econometrica editors 
to also average significantly more Econometrica articles. 
Overall, these results tend to reject the idea of pure undue favoritism. Namely, while we 
find that, all else equal, students working with QJE and RE Stat editors average statistically more 
publications in those journals we do not find that students working with AER editors average 
statistically more AER publications. At the same time, we find that students working with QJE 
editors average statistically more AER publications and that the estimated premium is nearly 70 percent larger than the estimated premium for QJE publications. Similarly, we find that students 
working with Econometrica editors average both significantly more JPE and ReStat publications 
than otherwise similar students and that the estimated ReStat premium is slightly large for 
students of Econometrica editors than for students of ReStat editors. In summary, the fact that 
statistically significant differences in the number of articles published in specific top economics 
journals are not observed strictly for students working with editors of those journals suggests that 
top journal editors are not choosing to publish articles written by their former students simply 
because they are their former students. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
We ask whether undue favoritism exists for students whose dissertation advisors serve on 
the editorial board of the top economics journals. We find students whose advisors are on the 
QJE editorial board average statistically more total articles, top 5 articles, total pages, and AEQ 
pages when compared to otherwise similar students. In terms of publications within specific top 
journals, we find that students of QJE editors average significantly more AER and QJE 
publications, students of Econometrica editors average statistically more and JPE articles ReStat 
articles, and that students of ReStat editors publish statistically more ReStat articles. These 
results taken together suggest that it is unlikely that top journal editors exhibit undue favoritism 
in the publication process with regards to their current and former students. These results also 
suggest that departments might want to pay greater attention to a student who works with an 
editor of the QJE.  One potential extension of this work is to compare publication rates in top 
ranked journals for graduates of top ranked programs to graduates of middle ranked programs in an attempt to disentangle whether graduates of top ranked programs receive undue favoritism 
from journal editors.   
 
   Notes 
 
1   www.econjobrumors.com/topic.php?id=5330&page=16. 
2   The five-year time frame is chosen to avoid any single-year aberrations that might bias 
the results. The 1990 starting point is chose because that is the year in which the database began 
including the name of the student’s dissertation advisor for the vast majority of dissertations 
filed, while the 1994 endpoint is chosen to allow significant time for students to develop 
publication records. To make sure that we do not include students writing on economic topics but 
belonging to different academic disciplines, we crossreference our list with the “Doctoral 
Dissertations in Economics Annual List” published each December in the Journal of Economic 
Literature. To ensure that the results are not dependent on the chosen timeframe, we estimated 
all models with smaller samples of years without observing significant differences in the results. 
3   These are the American Economic Review, Econometrica, the Journal of Political 
Economy, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, and the Review of Economics and Statistics. 
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 Table 1 
Summary Publishing Statistics By Dissertation Advisor’s Editorial Service at Top Economics Journals 
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                All Students  1,888  .164  .085  .045  .036  .057  .027 
               
                Advisor on an Editorial Board:               
                   Yes  .2288  .296  .308  .113  .171  .146  .056 
   No  .7712  .124  .080  .036  .021  .041  .031 
               
                Capacity in Which Advisor Served:               
                   AER Editorial Board  .0583  .246  .227  .064  .046  .100  .036 
   QJE Editorial Board  .0477  .356  .500  .167  .344  .111  .033 
   ReStat Editorial Board  .0932  .296  .301  .085  .182  .176  .063 
   Econometrica Editorial Board  .0630  .252  .168  .151  .059  .135  .093 
               
 Table 2 
Marginal Effects for Negative Binomial Regressions Controlling for Dissertation 
Advisor’s Editorial Service at Top Economics Journals 
 








         
          AER Editorial Board  .0336  .0090  .6519  .5493 
  (.0738)  (.0071)  (1.3082)  (.3741) 
          QJE Editorial Board  .1304**  .0137**  2.0683**  .5726* 
  (.0594)  (.0048)  (1.1125)  (.3136) 
          ReStat Editorial Board  -.0301  .0029  -.2533  .0287 
  (.0469)  (.0040)  (.8738)  (.2365) 
          Econometrica Editorial Board  .0911  .0078  1.6449  .4631 
  (.0659)  (.0054)  (1.2617)  (.3549) 
         
          Log Likelihood  -4,377.77  -1,094.64  -8,195.73  -4,686.02 
          Alpha  1.1020  2.2393  3.0479  6.5359 
  (.0539)  (.2735)  (.1065)  (.2965) 
         
 
Notes: Value listed in the column heading is the dependent variable.  Standard errors in 
parentheses.  **
, * significant at 5 and 10 percent levels.  Regressions also include 
categorical variables indicating the program tier of the student’s Ph.D. program, the 
worldwide Coupe ranking of the student’s dissertation advisor, binary dummy variables 
indicating the field in which the student’s dissertation was written (corresponding to 


















 Table 3 
Marginal Effects for Negative Binomial Regressions for Articles Published in Top 
Economics Journals Controlling for Dissertation Advisor’s Editorial Service at Top 
Economics Journals 
 








                    AER Editorial Board  .0022  -.0014  -.0008  .0014 
  (.0029)  (.0019)  (.0015)  (.0025) 
          QJE Editorial Board  .0039**  .0012  .0023**  .0011 
  (.0018)  (.0010)  (.0008)  (.0018) 
          ReStat Editorial Board  -.0009  -.0003  .0010  .0034** 
  (.0017)  (.0040)  (.0007)  (.0013) 
          Econometrica Editorial Board  .0001  .0025**  .0002  .0036** 
  (.0022)  (.0010)  (.0008)  (.0017) 
         
          Log Likelihood  -579.44  -322.37  -279.61  -399.70 
          Alpha  2.1023  1.5499  3.4528  2.5571 
  (.4346)  (.6744)  (1.0944)  (.4723) 
           
Notes: Value listed in the column heading is the dependent variable.  Standard errors in 
parentheses.  **
, * significant at 5 and 10 percent levels.  Regressions also include 
categorical variables indicating the program tier of the student’s Ph.D. program, the 
worldwide Coupe ranking of the student’s dissertation advisor, binary dummy variables 
indicating the field in which the student’s dissertation was written (corresponding to 
fields listed in December JEL), and whether the student was male and/or an 
international student. 
 
 
 